Securities lawyers play a central role in corporate disclosure by making, reviewing, and guiding disclosure decisions. Using the setting of SEC comment letters, we first examine how the involvement of external legal counsel (ELC) relates to the resolution of SEC disclosure inquiries. Our evidence suggests that ELC frequently resists disclosing new information by requesting the SEC redact information from public disclosure and amending prior disclosures less frequently. We then examine and find that ELC's participation with the inquiry response has externalities that relate to the company's future disclosures and financial reporting outcomes. Specifically, when ELC is involved we find evidence of greater qualified or cautionary language, more readable disclosures, and a reduced likelihood of negative disclosure outcomes. Overall, our evidence suggests that ELC's typical role is to resist the disclosure of new information to market participants and protect the company by mitigating future negative financial disclosure outcomes.
Introduction
Prior research studies how economic agents influence corporate disclosures. These studies focus extensively on whether and how financial reporting experts such as CEOs, boards of directors, and auditors influence disclosure.
1 However, because there is scant empirical research that investigates how securities law experts influence disclosure, their role is not well understood.
Anecdotal evidence suggests securities lawyers play a central role in facilitating disclosure by making, reviewing, and guiding corporate disclosure decisions. They leverage their legal expertise to help management comply with regulations and limit potential liability from improper, inaccurate, or incomplete disclosures. We exploit the comment letter setting to provide large sample, empirical evidence on the role securities law experts play in the disclosure process, specific to 1) the resolution of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure inquiries and 2) revisions to future disclosures consequent to the inquiry.
Understanding the role securities lawyers play in corporate disclosure is important for several reasons. First, securities law plays a critical role in well-functioning capital markets by governing financial markets. 2 Promoting transparent disclosure is a key purpose of securities laws.
rather than purely as advocates for the managers of the legal entities they represent; however, bar associations seem to deny such gatekeeper obligations (Coffee, 2003) .
To study the role of securities law experts in corporate disclosure, we exploit several unique features of the comment letter setting. First, comment letter inquiries serve to facilitate corporate disclosure by enforcing regulatory rules in the specific context of a company's facts and circumstances. 4 This enforcement is crucial to ensure the effectiveness of company's public disclosures (Christensen et al. 2013) . Second, comment letters frequently involve interactions with SEC lawyers in areas specific to securities law, as evidenced by SEC lawyers serving as points of contact for questions and by the types of comments which indicate a legal review. 5 Securities lawyers' advice is useful when addressing non-routine disclosure inquiries related to regulatory compliance. 6 Jointly, these facts speak to the prevalence and need for securities law expertise in facilitating disclosure compliance. Third, the public disclosure of comment letters allows us to observe the participants involved in issuing and responding to these inquiries, including companies' external lawyers. While securities law experts are likely involved in other disclosures, we are unaware of any requirement to disclose their involvement. The absence of a formal disclosure requirement makes it difficult to study the role of securities law experts, likely contributing to the paucity of research in this area.
We measure securities law expertise through external legal counsel (ELC) participation in the resolution of comment letter inquiries. Once a disclosure inquiry is resolved, ELC participation 4 Pursuant to Section 408 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance (DCF) enforces disclosure requirements by reviewing periodic filings of publicly traded companies at least once every three years to ensure the quality and completeness of their disclosures. Following a review, the DCF initiates a dialogue with a company using comment letters to seek clarification regarding its regulatory filings and/or to request that companies revise their disclosures to conform to SEC disclosure regulations (e.g., Reg S-K, Reg S-X, etc.) and U.S. GAAP. 5 Between 2002 and 2013, over 35% of the staff at DCF was comprised of securities law experts. 6 See, for example, "Responding to the SEC Comment Letter" (available at: http://www.agg.com/Responding-to-the-SEC-Comment-Letter-12-07-2012/) and "The SEC Has a Few Questions for You" (Johnson 2010) .
is revealed through comment letter correspondence made publicly available on EDGAR. 7 We document that approximately 35% of our sample observations involve ELC. We begin with descriptive evidence regarding the factors related to ELC involvement, which we later use to enhance the robustness of our analysis with propensity score matching. We find that companies with less SEC filing experience, greater external scrutiny, higher proprietary costs, and greater litigation risk are more likely to involve ELC. We also find that disclosure inquiry characteristics explain the propensity to involve ELC; inquiries that are more complex and less related to financial accounting issues are more likely to involve securities law experts.
Turning to our primary research questions, we next evaluate whether ELC participation is associated with resisting SEC disclosure inquiries versus expedient resolution of disclosure issues.
On the one hand, ELC may use its securities law expertise to resist the disclosure of new information either because managers hire it to do so or because lawyers advise their clients to do so.
We term this the resistance hypothesis. On the other hand, ELC may use its securities law expertise to resolve SEC inquiries more quickly and transparently by increasing disclosure, which we term the resolution hypothesis. We evaluate these contrasting outcomes by examining the relation between ELC involvement and two non-mutually exclusive characteristics of resolved inquiries: 1) the propensity to submit confidential treatment requests (CTRs), which redacts comment letter correspondence from public view, and 2) the propensity to revise the prior disclosure in question via an amended filing (Amend). Greater (lower) propensity to submit CTRs and lower (greater) propensities to amend are consistent with resistance (expedient and transparent resolution).
After controlling for company and comment letter characteristics, we find ELC involvement is associated with a 29% greater propensity to request confidential treatment of the otherwise 7 After (before) January 1, 2012, the SEC publicly released comment letter correspondence no sooner than 20 (45) business days following the completion of the review.
publicly available correspondence and a 9% lower propensity to amend periodic filings, relative to unconditional means. This evidence suggests that, on average, companies retain ELC to resist disclosing new information. Cross-sectional evidence indicates that ELC is more (less) likely to resist using CTRs when proprietary costs are high (the disclosure inquiry is more complex) and more likely to resist amending disclosures when the company is requested to do so. While our evidence suggests ELC facilitates resistance, on average, we also find evidence of ELC playing a resolution role, particularly when the disclosure inquiry requires the company to reveal bad news.
The latter is evidenced by negative short window equity market returns and greater insider selling prior to the public release of the comment letter.
Beyond addressing the specific issues raised in an SEC inquiry, ELC involvement likely generates a broad review of the companies' financial disclosures. Accordingly, we evaluate whether ELC involvement is associated with externalities in future financial disclosures (e.g., Hopkins et al. 2014; Cunningham et al. 2016) . On the one hand, ELC may be aware of common issues that trigger inquiry, and therefore use its securities law expertise to protect the firm against future disclosure inquiries. Consistent with a protection role, ELC may try to improve disclosures to insulate the company from future problems. On the other hand, ELC could help the company maintain minimal legal compliance, while providing partial or nontransparent disclosure. In other words, management could use ELC's expertise to provide as little information as possible, thus clouding disclosure.
We find evidence that ELC involvement in the comment letter inquiry relates to improvements in readability and an increase in qualified or cautionary language. While improvements in readability are expected to improve firms' information environments, increases in cautionary language, while consistent with a protection role, could deteriorate firms' information environments (e.g., Miller 2010; Lehavy et al. 2011; Loughran and McDonald 2011) . To better interpret these results, we examine the association between ELC involvement and the likelihood of future financial reporting problems. We find that ELC involvement is associated with lower propensities of future comment letters and restatements, consistent with ELC improving future disclosures by mitigating future negative financial disclosure outcomes.
Our study contributes to at least three streams of research. First, our results speak to the broad literature on companies that outsource particular tasks to external parties, rather than performing them in-house (e.g., Coase 1937; Grossman and Hart 1986) . Prior empirical studies examine the outsourcing of a variety of activities including internal audit, human resources, manufacturing, information technology, and R&D. 8 We contribute to this literature by providing evidence on the circumstances under which companies outsource securities law expertise. Second, we contribute to the growing literature on SEC comment letters by investigating an important but previously unexamined player in this process. 9 We provide evidence that securities law experts often participate in the resolution of disclosure inquiries and appear to play a role in facilitating future disclosure. Despite the relative prominence of the legal profession in the activities of both the SEC and public companies, to our knowledge we are the first to provide evidence on the role and influence of securities law experts in corporate disclosure. Lastly, we contribute to the growing literature on how legal experts affect financial reporting characteristics and outcomes. 10 While a few studies consider general legal expertise among the board of directors, most studies examine general 8 See, for example, Helper 1991; Loh and Venkatraman 1992; Higgins and Rodriguez 2006; Abbott et al. 2007; Caruth et al. 2013. 9 This literature focuses on the determinants and consequences of specific types of comment letters (e.g., Robinson et al. 2011; Ertimur and Nondorf 2006; Ettredge et al. 2011; Dechow et al. 2016; Cunningham et al. 2016) , understanding how the SEC monitors disclosure (e.g., Boone et al. 2013; Cassell et al. 2013; Gao et al. 2010) , and more recently on the benefits comment letters provide to the users of companies' financial disclosures (e.g., Bozanic et al. 2015; Brown et al. 2015; Johnston and Petacchi 2015) . 10 For example, prior research investigates how financial expertise among the independent audit committee members (e.g., Farber 2005; Dhaliwal et al. 2010; Bryan et al. 2013) , external auditor expertise (e.g., Reichelt and Wang 2010; Gul et al. 2009; Minutti-Meza 2014) , or outsourced internal audit expertise (e.g., Abbott et al. 2007 ) affect financial reporting quality.
legal expertise based on the prominence of a company's general (internal) counsel. 11 Our study differs in that our setting allows us to isolate securities law expertise and its relation to companies'
disclosures. As such, relative to financial accounting outcomes such as accruals, the disclosure outcomes we examine are more directly linked to the type of legal expertise we study. Furthermore, while the evidence that securities law expertise is associated with protection from future issues is consistent with Hopkins et al. (2014) , ELC's resistance to disclosure inquiries contrasts with prior evidence on the role of general counsel acting as a gatekeeper (e.g., Kwak et al. 2012; Bird et al. 2014 ).
Background on Legal Expertise and Related Literature
In practice, internal and external counsel typically fulfill different roles and contribute different types of legal expertise. Similar to other outsourced experts, ELC is typically retained for a particular expertise. For example, Latham and Watkins, a top-rated law firm, state that a significant part of their public company representation relates to "counseling clients in highly specialized areas of the law," such as securities law. 12 External legal experts are often retained when an issue does not occur with sufficient frequency to develop the expertise in-house (Morse 2004) . Internal counsel plays a more general role, such as dealing with contract review in the ordinary course of business, which is why internal counsel is often referred to as general counsel. DeMott (2005) describes four typical roles of a general counsel: legal adviser to corporation, officer and member of senior management, administrator of internal legal department, and agent of corporation in dealing with external parties, including securities law experts. Under the latter scenario, the general counsel reviews which issues require additional expertise and involves external counsel when necessary.
11 These studies find that internal general counsel prominence influences the market's assessment of security class action filings (Bird et al. 2014) , companies' propensity to manage earnings (Hopkins et al. 2014) , and the likelihood that companies issue voluntary management forecasts as well as their accuracy (Kwak et al. 2012 ). 12 http://www.lw.com/practices/PublicCompanyRepresentation Lee et al. (2013) show that, under certain conditions, having in-house counsel review and determine when external expertise is most useful maximizes efficiency.
Prior studies focus on the relation between general legal expertise and financial reporting.
As the participation of legal experts is difficult to observe given the absence of a formal disclosure requirement, prior studies define the intensity of general legal expertise as the number of board members with law degrees (e.g. Krishnan et al. 2011) or the presence of a general counsel among the top five highest paid members of management (Kwak et al. 2012; Bird et al. 2014) . These papers associate the presence of general legal expertise with better financial reporting quality, which is consistent with general legal experts fulfilling a gatekeeper role to enhance financial reporting. In contrast, Hopkins et al. (2014) find that the presence of legal expertise among top management is associated with lower accounting quality and more earnings management. They interpret this result as evidence that insider lawyers are captured by management and act as advocates of the managers of the legal entities they represent rather than gatekeepers.
Instead of focusing on general legal expertise that likely pertains to routine contract law, we focus specifically on securities law expertise. As SEC comment letters represent non-routine inquiries regarding securities law and regulatory compliance, they provide a setting where securities law expertise is likely to be particularly relevant. In addition, the SEC comment letter reveals the participation of external law firms, which allows us to distinguish between the presence and absence of securities law experts that is insensitive to a compensation or disclosure cut-off.
Hypothesis Development
When faced with a comment letter inquiry, the firm's managers have several possible courses of action. Assuming they do not wish to ignore the SEC's request because of reputational, regulatory, or litigation concerns, the firm's managers will need to plan and execute a strategy to address the inquiry, as well as to consider whether they need to make changes to their financial Kothari et al. 2009 ).
Hypothesis 1 -SEC Comment Letter Outcomes
Our first hypothesis explores whether the participation of ELC in the comment letter inquiry indirectly influences disclosure through comment letter outcomes. As such, our initial hypothesis begins to shed some light on the well-posed question raised by Coffee (2003) On the one hand, firms might engage ELC to hinder the disclosure inquiry, which we term the resistance hypothesis. Under the resistance hypothesis, ELC is retained to minimally comply with regulatory standards, such that its role is to use its expertise to avoid disclosing new information to the public when possible. That is, upon receiving the inquiry, managers hire external counsel in order to defend the firm's existing disclosure positions by withholding the additional information the SEC requests and/or by providing disclosures which obfuscate the true nature of the information requested. This view is aligned with how one typically considers the role of a litigator-that is, as "a bulwark between individuals or organizations and the political branches of government" (Davis 2003) . In other words, ELC acts as the client's shield against an "oppressive state" and advocates for the interests of its client, which may or may not align with the interests of the client's stakeholders (Coffee 2003) .
On the other hand, the role of the litigator may not necessarily apply to securities lawyers (Coffee 2003) . Firms could instead use ELC's securities law expertise to resolve complicated disclosure issues or to resolve SEC inquiries more quickly and transparently. We term this strategy the resolution hypothesis. The resolution hypothesis is consistent with the up-the-ladder reporting rules under Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which are intended to protect the company from any wrongdoing conducted by its agents. Similar to an auditor's opinion, this hypothesis is also consistent with the gatekeeper role invoked when the securities lawyer states to underwriters that all material information concerning the issuer has been disclosed properly. At times, the SEC has advocated that the securities lawyer has an obligation to force the client to comply with federal securities laws and has prosecuted attorneys for not doing so. 13 An emphasis on resolution could occur either because managers are truly unaware or inexperienced in the details of disclosure matters and/or because they lack internal resources to delegate the responsibility to an internal legal department. Our first hypothesis is as follows:
H1a: The participation of external legal counsel (ELC) in the comment letter process is associated with more resistance towards disclosing new information.
H1b:
The participation of external legal counsel (ELC) in the comment letter process is associated with less resistance towards the disclosing new information.
Hypothesis 2 -Future Disclosure Outcomes
Beyond navigating the particular issues raised by the SEC inquiry, the involvement of ELC ELC may use its securities law expertise to protect the firm against future disclosure inquiries. Through experience, ELC may be aware of common issues that trigger inquiry.
Consistent with a protection role, ELC may try to improve disclosures to protect the firm from future disclosure problems. This role is also aligned with the SEC's view that attorneys should play an important role as gatekeepers who enhance compliance with securities laws similar to an independent auditor (e.g., Coffee 2003; Lowenfels et al. 2006; Hopkins et al. 2015 ).
14 Alternatively, it is commonly asserted that lawyers "push the envelope" of the letter of the law, which may subvert the spirit of the law. That is, one can envision the level of corporate disclosure transparency and compliance on a continuum with aiding and abetting the dissemination of false or misleading disclosures as one extreme. The company could instead maintain minimal compliance with SEC laws and regulations while still providing partial, vague, or nontransparent disclosure. In other words, ELC may strive to seek a balance between the gatekeeper role promulgated by the SEC and the desire to zealously represent the client through minimal compliance which results in facilitating low quality disclosures (e.g., less readable, less transparent, less informative), but, absent fraud, does not violate securities laws (Hopkins et al. 2015) . In other words, management uses ELC's expertise to provide as little information as possible, thus clouding disclosure. If so, this would not only decrease future disclosure quality but could also increase the likelihood of future disclosure problems.
H2a: Participation of external legal counsel (ELC) in the comment letter process is associated with higher quality future financial disclosures.
H2b: Participation of external legal counsel (ELC) in the comment letter process is associated with lower quality future financial disclosures.
Data and Variable Measurement
The unit of observation in our study is a completed SEC comment letter conversation. A conversation begins with an initial inquiry letter from the SEC to a public company, continues with correspondence between the company and the SEC, and ends with a "No Further Comment" letter from the SEC. Following Cassell et al. (2013) , we focus on comment letter inquiries pertaining to 10-Ks because 10-K filings are complex, heavily relied upon disclosures that require extensive involvement from external advisors and tend to receive the greatest share of investor attention relative to other SEC filings (Drake et al. 2015) . Consistent with this notion, Bozanic et al. (2015) find 10-Ks are the most frequently referenced periodic filing in comment letters. Furthermore, focusing on comment letters that reference 10-K filings reduces some variation in comment letter characteristics, which improves comparability across the treatment and control samples. To mitigate the possible influence of errors affecting our analysis, we remove observations that are likely incomplete or recorded with error. Specifically, we remove 92 observations with only one round of correspondence and 127 observations in the bottom 1% (8 days or less) of the distribution for days of correspondence leading to resolution. These combined steps result in a final sample of 10,487
firm-year observations that correspond to 4,557 unique firms in Table 1 . 16 We extract and match entity names included in the comment letter conversation from the correspondence field in Audit Analytics to public company names in Audit Analytics, CRSP, and COMPUSTAT. Similar to Laurion et al. (2016) who measure whether the firm's auditor is copied in the comment letter correspondence, we measure securities law expertise by whether an external law firm directly responds to the SEC on behalf of the company or whether the company copies any external law firm on comment letter correspondence. 17 While direct response clearly indicates ELC involvement, discussions with securities lawyers in practice provide anecdotal support that copying ELC is common when it has provided advice and, at a minimum, reviewed the response. 18 While measurement error is possible to the extent companies do not copy external counsel on the correspondence, this likely biases against our findings. We believe management has strong incentives to copy an external lawyer, if involved, to signal the validity of its response.
19
16 Some 10-K inquiries also reference other SEC filings such as 10-Qs. Expanding our sample to include comment letters that reference 10-Q filings increases the sample size by 272 observations and yields similar inferences. 17 Entity names in the sent field (both the sent and cc fields) of comment letter responses remain consistent within a conversation over 90% (75%) of the time, indicating consistent involvement of parties within a conversation. 18 In untabulated sensitivity analysis, we evaluate whether direct response from ELC (ELC_SENT; ELC is the sender about 40% of the time they are involved) differs from ELC_COPY (i.e., where ELC is cc'd on the response letter). In support of anecdotal evidence, we typically find no statistical difference between ELC_SENT and ELC_COPY, though we note results where we find significant differences in Section 5. In additional sensitivity analysis, we control for who sent the response to the comment letter. Of those not sent by the ELC, 78% were sent by internal finance/accounting personnel, 14% by internal legal personnel, and 10% by CEO equivalent. Note these are not mutually exclusive categories because some senders have multiple titles, some letters have multiple senders, and some senders change throughout the response process. Controlling for which non-ELC sent the letter does not affect our main inferences. 19 If the signal has no "teeth" (i.e., mere window dressing but little actual ELC involvement), then we do not expect ELC to vary predictably with the comment letter outcomes we study. Relative to corporate governance studies that use cross-sectional characteristics of board members or management (e.g. Klein 2002; Bamber et al. 2010) , whose participation cannot be observed in any particular decision, our potential measurement error from not copying an involved lawyer is at least partially addressed by our first stage model of choosing to involve the lawyer.
To identify whether a party is in fact an external law firm, we first match party names to law firms listed on the American Lawyer listing of top 200 law firms. 20 All remaining unmatched parties are hand verified to determine whether the party is a law firm. Using this identification strategy, 3,657 firm-year observations, or 35% of our sample, retain a securities law expert via ELC.
21 Table 2 reports descriptive statistics using untransformed values. The median company in our sample has a market capitalization of $791 million, 14 years of being a publicly traded company, five analysts following the company, and approximately 67% of shares held by
institutions. This suggests that the SEC tends to focus its disclosure review resources on larger public companies with greater visibility. The average comment letter contains 1,200 words, references 2.1 forms, and requests an amendment 36% of the time. On average, 17% of the sample requests confidential treatment of comment letter discussions and 19% amend a 10-K filing within 90 days of receiving a comment letter. The frequency of future restatements within two years of an initial comment letter is 6.7%; 43% of the sample receives a future "off-cycle" comment letter. 
Methodology and Results

Determinants of Retaining ELC
We first examine whether company and comment letter characteristics are associated with the decision to involve ELC. Outsourcing theory (e.g., Hatonen and Eriksson 2009) outlines at least three major benefits that organizations could realize from seeking resources outside their company: 1) enhancing capabilities by accessing scarce resources, such as highly skilled labor; 2) lowering 20 American Lawyer ranks prestigious law firms based upon the amount of annual legal fees generated. 21 We caveat that the percentage that involve ELC could be higher if not all firms cc their ELC on the comment letter when submitting a response to the SEC. We also note that for firms with multiple comment letter conversations (N=4,430), ELC involvement changes (i.e., ∆ELC is non-zero) for 18% of our sample observations, whereas 82% of our sample observations retain ELC/no ELC for two consecutive comment letters (i.e., ∆ELC is zero). 22 We define an "off-cycle" comment letter to be a comment letter received in the two years following the current comment letter inquiry. This contrasts an "on-cycle" comment letter which could plausibly be received once every three years, given the mandatory review of firms' filings by law once every three years.
cost; and 3) improving outcomes. Consistent with companies leveraging outside expertise when they are less experienced, we predict and find that larger companies (Mrkt_Cap: log of market capitalization), older companies (Company_Age: log of one plus the number of years the company has been publicly traded on CRSP), and domestic companies (Domestic: an indicator if the company has headquarters in the United States) are less likely to involve ELC (p<0.01), as presented in Column 1 of Table 3 . Also consistent with the need to leverage outside expertise, more complex disclosures (10-K WC: the log of one plus the number of words in the most recent, prior 10-K filing) are positively associated with ELC involvement (p<0.10).
Consistent with a higher cost of comment letter response mismanagement, we find evidence that greater external scrutiny and higher proprietary costs are positively associated with ELC involvement. We proxy for external scrutiny with an indicator equal to one if the company had a securities class action lawsuit in the last three years (Recent_Litigation), an indicator equal to one if the company had a restatement in the last three years (Restate), the log of one plus number of analysts covering the company (N_Analysts), and the percentage of shares held by institutions (IO).
Following Li et al. (2013) , we proxy for proprietary cost using the ratio of research and development expense to average total assets (R&D) and the ratio of competition related words to total words in the 10-K (10-K Competition). We find that firms with more restatements, analyst coverage, R&D investment, and competition are more likely to involve ELC (p<0.10 or better).
We include additional company characteristics in Equation 1. Since external legal experts are more likely to specialize in Delaware corporate law due to economies of scale and the existence of well-developed legal precedents (Bebchuk and Cohen 2003) , we include an indicator if the company is incorporated in Delaware (Delaware). We capture variation in auditor expertise based on whether the company has a Big Four (Big4) or second tier (Tier2) auditor. To examine company performance, we use return on assets based on operating income before depreciation, R&D, and advertising expense (adjROA); buy and hold returns for the 12 months prior to the comment letter (BHAR); and the standard deviation of monthly returns for the 12 months prior to the comment letter (Std_Ret). We find that firms incorporated in Delaware, with second tier auditors, or greater stock volatility are more likely to involve ELC (p<0.10 or better).
Next, we investigate whether comment letter characteristics explain variation in ELC participation in Column 2 of Table 3 . We expect and find that ELC involvement is more likely when comment letters reflect more complex inquiries. We proxy for comment letter complexity using an indicator equal to one if the SEC requested the company amend a filing (Request Amend),
an indicator equal to one if the comment letter references a prior amended filing (Reference Amend), the log of one plus the number of words in the initial comment letter (CL Length), and the number of filings referenced by the comment letter (CL Forms). Firms are more likely to involve ELC if the SEC requests an amendment, references a prior amended filing, contains more words, or references more filings (p<0.01).
We also examine whether comment letter inquiries related to the narrative portion of disclosures are more likely to benefit from securities law expertise relative to inquiries about the financial statements and footnotes where technical accounting expertise is more beneficial. We proxy for the former using indicators for whether the comment letter raises issues that relate to risk factor disclosures (OpCR) or securities regulations issues (Reg_SK). We proxy for the latter using an indicator for whether accounting standard issues (AccStd) and financial reporting issues that relate to supporting footnotes (Reg SX) are raised in the comment letter. We also consider whether the comment letter references issues with new securities registrations, which are likely associated with greater legal concerns. We proxy for new securities registrations using an indicator for whether the comment letter raises issues regarding new and secondary registrations (New_Registration).
While we fail to find evidence that ELC participation is greater for narrative disclosure topics (p>0.10), we do find evidence that ELC participation is less likely when the comment letter pertains to accounting issues (AccStd; p<0.01). Comment letters that reference registration of new securities are positively associated with the propensity to hire ELC (p<0.01).
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The individual results for Columns 1 and 2 are similar to the combined model presented in Column 3 of Table 3 , indicating that both company and comment letter characteristics jointly explain the decision to retain securities law experts. The combined explanatory power results in an area below the ROC curve of 0.70, which suggests good explanatory power. 24 Further, the results appear to validate our proxy for securities law expertise, given that we find ELC participation is greater when the benefits of securities law expertise are higher.
Addressing Sample Selection
Because our analyses can only be conducted on companies that receive a comment letter, a sample selection problem arises which could affect our analyses, as receiving a comment letter is not a random event. Companies that do not receive a comment letter either weren't reviewed or, if reviewed, were not found to have deficient disclosure in their filing. To provide descriptive statistics on this issue, we examine the SEC Congressional Budget over our sample period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . On average, the SEC reports that 41% of company filings are reviewed annually.
Multiplying this fraction by the number of SEC registrants, we estimate the number of filings reviewed by the SEC. We compared the number of filings reviewed (average of 4,954) with those that received comments letters (average of 4,247), which suggests that 86% of companies receive a comment letter upon review.
More formally, we evaluate whether sample selection affects our analysis by estimating a probit model. We follow Cassell et al. (2013) (Guo and Fraser 2010, p. 85-125) .
We find that the Wald chi-square test is unable to reject the null hypothesis of RHO=0 (p>0.75),
indicating no evidence of a sample selection bias affecting the propensity to retain ELC. As a result, we do not adjust for sample selection of this form in our subsequent analyses. 
SEC Comment Letter Outcomes (H1a and H1b)
Having evaluated whether company and comment letter characteristics are associated with decisions to retain securities law expertise, we next examine whether the role of the securities lawyer is consistent with either the resistance or resolution hypothesis through an analysis of comment letter outcomes. We evaluate H1a and H1b using several different empirical approaches. (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) . To do 27 We omit Delaware as a control variable because we use it as an instrument in untabulated instrumental variable regressions where we find that our results for CTR are robust. We further note that when we include this instrument in our subsequent specifications (levels, changes, and PSM) our inferences remain unchanged. In untabulated analyses, we include an indicator for the presence of a highly paid general counsel (e.g., Kwak et al. 2012) . We use several databases to obtain employee titles among the top five employees with the highest salary to maximize our sample (Execucomp, Boardex, Equilar, and Capital IQ). Our tabulated analyses are all robust to the inclusion of this variable, though it results in a sample loss of 9% and is thus omitted from our main specification. 28 In untabulated analysis we examine companies that receive multiple comment letters in our sample period. We partition these firms into those that consistently involve or do not involve ELC across time (non-switchers) and those that change ELC involvement through time (switchers). We find ELC is associated with more CTRs and fewer amendments in both subsamples. Taken together, consistent results across switchers and non-switchers provide stronger evidence that the relation between ELC and SEC comment letter outcomes is unlikely to be driven by either timevarying correlated omitted variables or time-invariant correlated omitted variables. evaluate whether on average ELC is used to resist or resolve disclosure inquiries. Table 4 , Panel A reports results from tests on the relation between ELC and the propensity to submit CTRs of the comment letter. Columns 1 and 3 report the estimation of probit regressions using levels and propensity score matched analyses, respectively. Column (2) reports a changes analysis using OLS. The positive and significant coefficient on ELC across all three specifications (Columns 1-3; p<0.01) supports the resistance hypothesis (H1a). Specifically, on average, securities law experts more frequently resist the SEC inquiry by requesting the SEC redact potentially sensitive information from public disclosure of comment letter correspondence. In terms of economic magnitude in Column 1, companies are 5% more likely to make a CTR when ELC participates in the comment letter conversation, which reflects a 29.4% increase relative to the unconditional likelihood of CTRs in the sample (17%).
Propensity to Make a CTR
30,31
29 In particular, we highlight the comment letter complexity variables (Request Amend, Reference Amend, CL Length, and CL Forms) are insignificantly different from zero (p>0.10) across the propensity score matched treatment and control samples. This mitigates concerns that endogeneity from more complex comment letters, which could be associated with an increased need for securities expertise, is driving our results. 30 Economic magnitudes are estimated using a marginal effects analysis holding all other independent variables constant at their means. When ELC directly responds to the SEC inquiry (i.e., sends the letter rather than being copied), the While the prior results on average support the resistance hypothesis, we also evaluate whether the role of ELC might vary based upon circumstances. For example, resistance through CTRs may be in the best interest of the company in order to protect proprietary information or avoid disclosure related to poor performance (e.g., Verrecchia and Weber 2006) . Alternatively, if the disclosure inquiry is complex, the experience of ELC may be needed to help navigate the deficiency and facilitate resolution through transparent disclosure rather than resistance, such that we would observe less frequent CTRs in these cases. First, we examine proprietary costs (High R&D: defined as companies with R&D/Assets above the sample median) and poor performance (Loss: defined as companies with net income before extraordinary items less than zero) as possible instances more likely to be associated with resistance through CTR. Second, we examine complex inquires (CL Length and CL Forms, defined previously) as instances less likely to be associated with CTR.
In Table 4 , Panel B we find positive and significant coefficients on the interaction terms in Columns 1 and 2 (ELC x High R&D and ELC x Loss; p<0.01), consistent with the resistance hypothesis (H1a). Relative to the propensity to submit CTRs when ELC are involved (21%), companies with proprietary cost concerns (High R&D and Loss) are 19% and 25% more likely to request confidential treatment when ELC is involved, respectively. 32 In contrast, we find evidence of resolution (H1b) through fewer CTRs when the disclosure inquiry is more complicated; we find negative coefficients on the interaction terms in Columns 3 and 4 (ELC x CL Length and ELC x CL Forms; p<0.10 or better). Relative to the unconditional propensity to submit CTRs, companies with more complicated disclosure inquiries (CL Length and CL Forms) are 3% and 6% less likely to economic magnitude of the relation strengthens to 7.7% relative to 3.7% when the ELC does not send the response (p<0.05). 31 Untabulated control variables reveal no evidence that a large/high quality auditor is associated with the propensity to issue a CTR (p=0.46). In our sample, auditors from the Big 4 are copied 10% of the time they are the auditor. This supports anecdotal evidence provided by discussions with national audit partners that audit firms are made aware of comment letter issues and are only involved in letters relevant to their expertise. Untabulated analyses confirm that Big 4 being copied is also unrelated to CTRs. 32 The marginal effect of ELC * HIGH R&D is 3.9% and the marginal effect of ELC * LOSS is 5.2%.
request confidential treatment when ELC is involved, based on a one standard deviation change in the measures, respectively. Combined, these results suggest that, on average, ELC is retained to aid with resistance. However, we find that in some circumstances ELC is more likely to be retained to facilitate resolution, resulting in less frequent CTRs.
Propensity to Amend Periodic Filings
In Table 5 , Panel A we report results on the relation between ELC and our second comment letter outcome of interest, amendments (Amend). Amendments represent the disclosure of new information through the adjustment of previously disclosed filings that were incorrect, unclear, or incomplete. The analyses are reported in levels, changes, and PSM across Columns 1-3, respectively. We find additional evidence consistent with the resistance hypothesis (H1a) insofar as we find negative and significant coefficients on ELC in Columns 1 and 3 (p<0.05 and p<0.10, respectively), indicating fewer amendments in response to disclosure inquiries when ELC is involved. In terms of economic magnitude in Column 1, companies are 1.8% less likely to issue amendments when ELC participates in the comment letter conversation, which reflects a 9.5% decrease relative to the unconditional likelihood of amendments in the sample (19%). This result is consistent with ELC resisting the disclosure of new information, on average.
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Similar to results for CTRs, in Panel B we extend this analysis to a conditional evaluation of cases where an amended filing is referenced or when an amendment is requested to better understand when ELC is more or less likely to be associated with the resistance of new disclosure.
We expect that resistance in the form of avoiding an amendment is more likely to occur when an amendment is requested/referenced. Examining resistance in the presence of requested/referenced 33 To evaluate whether the involvement of Big 4 auditors in the resolution of comment letter inquiries is associated with amendment activity we include an indicator when these auditors are copied in the correspondence. Untabulated analyses fail to find evidence of an association between copying Big 4 auditors and amendment activity.
amendments provides a stronger test than "on average" results which draw inferences from observations where firms did not amend in the absence of requested/referenced amendments.
Consistent with H1a, we find a negative and significant coefficient (p<0.05 or better) when we interact Request Amend (Reference Amend) with ELC. In terms of economic magnitudes, a company receiving a comment letter that references (requests) an amendment is 6.4% (3%) less likely to amend with ELC participation.
While our previous tests suggest ELC involvement is more likely to resist disclosure amendments on average, there are likely cases where resistance may not be possible, such as when firms need to report bad news. Prior literature (e.g., Skinner 1994) asserts that firms have higher litigation risk when disclosing bad news, suggesting that ELC expertise may be useful in these cases. To further evaluate whether the ELC's role in amendments could also support resolution in disclosing bad news, we examine the relation between ELC involvement and short window stock returns around the amendment. This test is limited to a subsample of firms that not only received comment letters, but also filed an amendment in connection with the SEC inquiry. Nearly all amendments in our sample occur prior to the public release of the comment letter (86%, untabulated), such that market participants are unlikely to know whether ELC is involved at the amendment filing date. 34 Thus, the structure of this test enables us to determine ex-post whether ELC involvement occurs more frequently when bad news was disclosed.
In Table 5 , Panel C we report that the two-day size-adjusted equity market return (0, +1) centered on the amended filing date is approximately -0.5% more negative relative to inquiries without ELC involvement. In Column 2, we consider changes in decisions to retain ELC (one is a change from no ELC to ELC) and find that the two-day size-adjusted equity market return (0, +1) 34 Our inferences remain unchanged by removing the 14% of observations that amend just after the comment letter resolution.
centered on the amended filing date is approximately -0.6% more negative for firms that change their ELC retention. Untabulated univariate tests indicate the mean return for an amendment without ELC participation is not different from zero (p>0.10). Thus, the evidence is consistent with our conjecture that ELC is retained by management to help resolve the disclosure of bad news when resistance (i.e., avoiding an amendment) may not be possible. In sum, the results presented in the panels of Table 5 suggest that while ELC involvement is associated with resistance to disclosure amendments on average, variation occurs with regards to when these incentives are stronger and weaker.
Overall, our evidence pertaining to our first hypothesis suggests that securities law expertise is associated with greater resistance to disclosure inquiries. However, while ELC is associated with resisting new disclosure on average (H1a), cross-sectional evidence reveals that in some cases ELC also facilitates resolution (H1b). We next extend the preceding analyses to capital market activities to better understand the motivations of managers for ELC use and perceptions of such use by investors associated with the public disclosure of comment letters.
Capital Market Activity Associated with the Public Disclosure of SEC Inquiries
Following the resolution of a disclosure inquiry, all of the correspondence between the SEC and the company is publicly released via EDGAR. Prior studies provide evidence that the public disclosure of comment letters relates to insider selling and garners market reactions (Dechow et al. 2016; Johnson 2015; Ryans 2015) . We build on these studies by examining whether ELC involvement relates to capital market activity associated with the public disclosure of comment letters. Dechow et al. (2016) provide evidence that insiders sell abnormal amounts of stock just prior to the public comment letter release, implying that managers' anticipation of these disclosures will be viewed negatively by market participants. In other words, increased insider selling confirms that insiders anticipate the disclosure of bad news. Similar to Dechow et al. (2016) , we examine the amount of stock the CEO and CFO sell over the 10 trading day period preceding the public comment letter disclosure event. As a control window, we use a random 10 trading day period chosen for the same company during the period three to six months before or after the public disclosure date. Consistent with Dechow et al. (2016) , in Table 6 , Panel A we report evidence of greater abnormal insider selling just prior to the public release of the comment letter (p<0.01), suggesting on average insiders anticipate negative market reactions upon public disclosure of comment letters.
ELC Involvement and Insider Selling
We extend this finding by examining whether ELC involvement is related to insider selling activity. If ELC prevents the disclosure of new information, we expect no abnormal insider selling because managers do not anticipate a market reaction given that no new information is disclosed.
Alternatively, if ELC facilitates the disclosure of new information, we expect managers to be motivated to sell in anticipation of a negative market response (i.e., they exploit information asymmetry between managers and investors prior to the comment letter release). We report the results from this analysis in Panel B. We find evidence of abnormal insider selling before the comment letter release when an ELC is not involved with the disclosure inquiry (p<0.01), but find no evidence of abnormal insider selling when an ELC is involved (p>0.10). The latter is consistent with ELC resisting (H1a) the disclosure of new information on average, as documented in our prior results. We note that the difference in difference across the ELC and No ELC samples are only weakly significant using a one-sided test (p=0.09). This weak significance could be driven in part because of variation in management motives within the ELC sample.
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To explore variation within the ELC sample, in Panel C we partition comment letter inquiries with ELC involvement based on whether the inquiry also includes a request from the SEC to make an amended filing. Our prior evidence suggests that ELC is more likely to help facilitate the disclosure of bad news when the SEC requests the firm make an amendment. Accordingly, we expect managers to sell more stock in advance of the public disclosure of the comment letter if they anticipate a greater negative market response. Consistent with this conjecture, we find evidence of abnormal insider selling (p<0.10) when comment letters involve both ELC and amendment requests, which is significantly different from insider selling activity in the no amendment request sample that involve ELC (p<0.05). This result suggests that information asymmetry is present between managers and investors prior to the public comment letter release when the ELC is retained to resolve (H1b) bad news disclosures (i.e., when ELC participates and an amendment is requested).
ELC Involvement and Stock Returns
To corroborate the insider selling motivations documented in Section 5.4.1 and to provide evidence about how investors interpret comment letter disclosures in connection with ELC involvement, we next examine the equity market reaction to the public release of comment letters. It is important to note that insider selling corresponds with managers' beliefs and may, but need not, correspond with investors' beliefs. Notwithstanding this caveat, we examine the two-day sizeadjusted equity market return (0, +1) centered on the comment letter disclosure event date to evaluate whether or not investor behavior is aligned with managers' beliefs in Table 7 . 35 To this point, in the next panel we document variation in management insider trading incentives based on whether there is an SEC amendment request. We assert that companies involving ELC with amendment requests likely anticipate a more negative market response than other companies involving ELC. Consistent with this assertion, after we remove amendment request observations from the ELC sample, we find that the difference between ELC and non-ELC insider selling that was previously weakly significant is now significant (p<0.06, two-sided test, untabulated).
Consistent with ELCs resisting the disclosure of new information, as well as the absence of abnormal insider selling reported in Table 6 , Panel B, we find no evidence of a market response to the public release of a comment letter when an ELC is involved. However, we do find that when ELC is involved and an amendment is requested, the equity market reacts more negatively to the public release of the comment letter in the short window (0, +1), with larger negative reactions occurring over the next two months of -2% (0, +50). The negative market reactions when ELC is involved and an amendment is requested are consistent with ELC being retained by management to help resolve the disclosure of bad news and also corresponds with the presence of abnormally high insider selling reported in Panel C of Table 6 .
Overall, the capital market evidence is consistent with ELC involvement leading to resisting disclosure on average (H1a), such that managers have no motivation to sell in advance of comment letter public release, and likewise markets do not respond to the public release of the comment letter. However, consistent with ELC using their its expertise to resolve complicated inquiries that lead to the disclosure of bad news (H1b), when ELC is involved and amendments are requested, insiders sell in anticipation of additional bad news disclosures, and markets respond negatively subsequent to the comment letter public release.
Future Disclosure (H2a and H2b)
Disclosure Attributes
Next we evaluate whether and how ELC impacts companies' future financial disclosurenamely, whether ELC involvement is associated with positive or negative financial reporting externalities (H2a and H2b). To do so, we initially evaluate several qualitative disclosure attributes found by prior research to be meaningful to investors through their associations with companies' information environments (e.g., Miller 2010; Lehavy et al. 2011; Loughran and McDonald 2011) .
In the regression below, we control for the lagged disclosure attribute, as well as for the firm and comment letter characteristics used in the previous analysis.
10-K Disclosure Attribute = α + β 1 ·ELC + β 2 ·Lag(10-K Disclosure Attribute) + γ i ·Firm Characteristics + δ i ·Comment Letter Characteristics + SEC Office Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + ε
We extract several qualitative disclosure attributes from the 10-K that follows a comment letter review. We compute: disclosure readability (higher values of the Fog Index represent less readable documents); disclosure length using the log of the number of words (longer documents require additional processing that may reduce readability); and the fraction of litigious, uncertain, and weak modal words following Loughran and McDonald (2011) . Litigious words represent language that may reflect a more litigious environment (e.g., "legislation," "testimony," and "tort");
uncertain words represent language denoting imprecision (e.g., "approximate," "contingency," and "depend"); and weak modal words express lower levels of confidence (e.g., "could," "might," and "possibly").
We report the results from estimating Equation 3 in Table 8 , Panel A. We find evidence that ELC involvement is associated with improved readability (Y=Fog; β 1 is negative; p<0.01) and an increase in qualified or cautionary language in the 10-K subsequent to the SEC inquiry. The latter is supported by increases in both uncertain (Uncertain; β 1 is positive; p <0.10) and weak modal language (Y=Weak Modal; β 1 is positive; p<0.01). We find no change in the length of disclosures (Y=Length; β 1 is not significantly different from zero; p>0.10) or the use of litigious words (Y=Litigation; β 1 is not significantly different from zero; p>0.10). 36 Collectively, these results suggest that ELC involvement with a disclosure inquiry is associated with changes in the qualitative disclosure attributes of future filings. However, we cannot yet conclude whether these results are 36 Untabulated analyses confirm these results are robust to using a propensity score matched sample matched on the propensity to hire ELC.
generally consistent with H2a or H2b since the former results are consistent with H2a, yet the latter results are consistent with H2b. Thus, to shed light on the interpretation of these results, we conclude by evaluating whether ELC involvement is associated with higher or lower propensities of future financial reporting problems.
Disclosure Outcomes
Prior research finds that more readable disclosures improve investors' information environments (e.g., Miller 2010; Lehavy et al. 2011) , whereas more uncertain and weak modal language are associated with greater return volatility and poorer information environments (Loughran and McDonald 2011) . Given the conflicting effects on the information environment, the results found in Table 8 , Panel A do not allow us to unambiguously conclude whether ELC involvement is associated with disclosure improvements designed to protect the firm from future disclosure issues. If improvements in readability and increases in cautionary language improve (reduce) disclosure quality, we would expect to see fewer (more) future restatements and future comment letters. 37 We investigate the association between ELC involvement and the likelihood of future financial reporting problems that indicate low disclosure quality. Specifically, we investigate whether the two-year period beginning with the resolution of the comment letter results in lower propensities of restatements and future comment letters. We focus on a future two-year period as it corresponds with an "off-cycle" comment letter.
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In Table 8 , Panel B we find that ELC involvement is associated with a lower propensity of restatements (Y=Future Restatement; β 1 is negative; p<0.05) and a lower propensity of receiving a 37 We would like to thank the reviewers for recommending these tests, which are in part motivated by Hopkins et al. (2014) and Cunningham et al. (2016) who examine future restatement and comment letter likelihoods, respectively. 38 See footnote 22.
comment letter (Y=Future Comment Letter; β 1 is negative; p<0.05), which is consistent with H2a.
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Relative to the unconditional means of 6.7% and 43.1%, firms with ELC involvement are 14.8%
and 5.3% less likely to have a future restatement or future comment letter, respectively. 40 In sum, by mitigating future negative financial disclosure outcomes, the collective evidence provided across the panels suggests that the involvement of ELC in the comment letter process serves to improve companies' future disclosures.
Summary and Conclusion
Our study provides some of the first evidence regarding why securities law experts are retained to resolve disclosure issues and how they influence firms' disclosure practices. We exploit the comment letter setting to shed light on the circumstances under which companies seek advice from securities lawyers and how the involvement of such experts relates to navigating SEC disclosure inquiries. In so doing, we enhance our understanding of the role and influence of a largely behind-the-scenes, external advisor to the company on corporate disclosure matters.
First, we evaluate whether the involvement of ELC in SEC disclosure inquires is consistent with the resistance versus resolution hypotheses. Our evidence suggests that securities law expertise is associated with greater resistance to disclosure inquiries. Namely, we find that ELC involvement is associated with more frequent requests to redact comment letter discussions from public view and a lower propensity to amend prior periodic filings. While ELCs are associated with resisting new disclosure on average, in some cases ELCs serve to resolve disclosure inquiries, particularly when disclosure inquiries are complex or when the manager needs to reveal bad news.
39 Similar results are obtained when using a one-year period. We chose a two-year period to tabulate given the normal cycle of SEC scrutiny is once every three years, which is essentially a test of whether ELC effort mitigates "off-cycle" comment letter reviews. As such, we note that we do not find evidence of a three-year effect (p>0.10). 40 Untabulated analyses confirm these results are robust to using a propensity score matched sample matching on the propensity to hire ELC.
Second, we evaluate whether and how ELC involvement impacts companies' future financial disclosures. We find evidence that ELC involvement is associated with improved readability and an increase in qualified or cautionary language in the filing subsequent to the inquiry. We also find that ELC involvement is associated with lower propensities of restatements and receiving comment letters. Collectively, our evidence suggests that securities law expertise in the comment letter process serves to improve company's future disclosures by protecting against potentially negative disclosure problems in the future.
The insights of our study contribute to a growing literature on the role of experts in corporate disclosure by examining how securities law experts facilitate disclosure compliance.
While ELC's resistance to disclosure inquiries contrasts with extant empirical evidence on the role of general legal expertise among company insiders (e.g., Kwak et al. 2012) , our evidence that securities law expertise is associated with protection from future disclosure issues is consistent with Hopkins et al. (2014) . We also contribute to the growing literature on SEC comment letters by examining an important but previously unstudied player in this process. That is, we provide evidence that ELCs often help the firm resist SEC disclosure inquiries, yet such involvement is associated with positive financial reporting externalities.
Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variable Description Primary Variables
ELC
Set to one if the company's comment letter correspondence includes external legal counsel and zero otherwise CTR Set to one if the company made a confidential treatment request in response to a comment letter and zero otherwise Amend
The number of 10-K or 10-Q amendments the company made between the first comment letter and three months after the last comment letter CL Return
Signed size-adjusted cumulative return in the corresponding windows relative to the date on which the comment letter conversation is made public by the SEC Amend_Ret Signed size-adjusted cumulative return in the (0, 2) window of a company's amendment filing 10-K Readability Fog Index of the 10-K filing 10-K Length
The natural logarithm of the number of words contained in the 10-K filing 10-K Litigation
The ratio of the number of litigious words to total words (Loughran and McDonald 2011) 
10-K Uncertainty
The ratio of the number of uncertain words to total words (Loughran and McDonald 2011) 
10-K Weak Modal
The ratio of the number of weak modal words to total words (Loughran and McDonald 2011) Future Restatement Set to one if the company restates earnings in the two-year period after the initial comment letter Future Comment Letter Set to one if the company receives a subsequent comment letter in the two-year period after the initial comment letter
Company Control Variables
Mrkt_Cap The log of the market cap at the end of the most recent fiscal year in millions Book-to-Market Ratio of the book value of common equity to market value at the end of the most recent fiscal year Company Age
The log of one plus the public age of the company based on CRSP data Domestic Set to one if the company is headquartered inside the United States based on Compustat LOC and zero otherwise Recent_Litigation Set to one if the company had a securities class action lawsuit in the three years prior to the comment letter using the Stanford Litigation database and zero otherwise Restate Set to one if the company had a restatement in the three years prior to the comment letter based on Audit Analytics data and zero otherwise N_Analysts
The log of one plus the number of analysts covering the company prior to the initial SEC comment letter using I/B/E/S IO The percentage of a company's shares held by institutions prior to the initial SEC comment letter using Thompson 10-K WC
The natural logarithm of the number of words in the most recent 10-K filing R&D The ratio of R&D expense to average total assets High R&D Set to one if the company has R&D/Assets above the sample median and zero otherwise 10-K Competition Ratio of competition-related words to total words in the 10-K as in Li et al. (2013) On behalf of our client, Ascent Solar Technologies, Inc. (the "Company" or "Ascent"), we are responding to the Commission's letter dated July 31, 2009 regarding the periodic filings referenced above.
ii. Excerpt taken from U.S. Energy Corp response letter to comment letter dated July 6, 2010:
We are in receipt of your above referenced letter relating to the periodic reports and proxy statement. It is our understanding that on July 6, 2010, you discussed some of the comments with Stephen Rounds, our outside securities counsel. Below is the text of the staff comments, and our proposed responses and the timing thereof, taking into account the discussion with Mr. Rounds. Table 3 presents a model of factors that may influence a company to retain securities law expertise in response to a comment letter. Columns 1 and 2 include firm and comment letter variables separately whereas Column 3 contains both. Column 4 includes the inverse mills ratio from a comment letter selection model based on Cassell et al. (2013) . Model fit is assessed by the area under the ROC curve. Z-statistics, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskadasticity and clustered by company. SEC office, industry, and year fixed effects are included in all regressions, but not reported for parsimony. Statistical significance (two-sided) is denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Panel A reports results using a probit levels regression (Column 1), using an OLS first differences of the levels model (Column 2), and a probit levels regression on a propensity score matched sample (Column 3). Panel B reports cross-sectional results regarding the influence of proprietary costs and comment letter complexity on the association between securities law expertise and the likelihood of a confidential treatment request. All results are based on probit regressions and include proxy main effects and SEC office, industry, and year fixed effects (except Panel A Column 2 which only includes year fixed effects due to differencing), but not reported for parsimony. Statistical significance (two-sided) is denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Panel A reports results regarding the association between securities law expertise and the likelihood of an amended filing in connection with the comment letter process. Column 1 presents the results based on a probit levels regression approach. Column 2 reports an OLS changes model regression using first differences of the levels model. Column 3 reports the probit levels results using a propensity score matched sample. SEC office, industry, and year fixed effects are included in Columns 1 and 3 models and year fixed effects are included in Column 2, but not reported for parsimony. Statistical significance (two-sided) is denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions.
III. Example of Confidential Treatment Request
Panel B reports cross-sectional results regarding the influence of SEC amendment requests and references to amend on the association between securities law expertise and the likelihood of an amended filing in connection with the comment letter process. All results are based on probit regressions and include proxy main effects and SEC office, industry, and year fixed effects, but not reported for parsimony. Statistical significance (two-sided) is denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions.
Panel C reports results regarding the association between securities law expertise and the release of bad news using a sample of comment letters associated with filing amended periodic filings. All results are based on OLS regressions and include SEC office, industry, and year fixed effects, suppressed for parsimony. Statistical significance (two-sided) is denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Table 7 reports results regarding the association between securities law expertise and insider selling prior to the public release of the comment letter. Panel A replicates Dechow et al. (2016) . Panels B and C extend Dechow et al. (2016) to focus on the role of ELC. Similar to Dechow et al. (2016) , treatment firms are those with open market insider selling activity by CEOs and CFOs in the (-10, -1) window prior to the public release of the comment letter and control firms are those with open market insider selling activity by CEOs and CFOs during a randomly selected date three to six months before or after the public release of the comment letter. Statistical significance (two-sided) is denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Table 7 reports results regarding the association between securities law expertise and the public release of comment letters where the SEC requested an amendment. All results are based on OLS regressions and include SEC office, industry, and year fixed effects, suppressed for parsimony. Statistical significance (two-sided) is denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Panel A reports results on the association between ELC and disclosure attributes of the 10-K following the comment letter inquiry. Panel B reports results on the association between ELC and the likelihood of future disclosure errors and future comment letters in the subsequent two years after the initial comment letter. All results are based on probit regressions and include SEC office, industry, and year fixed effects, suppressed for parsimony. Statistical significance (two-sided) is denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions.
